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European Central Bank Working Paper Series  44Abstract
In a famous episode of ￿nancial history which lasted over eight years, the market for the future on the
Bund moved entirely from LIFFE, a London-based derivatives exchange, to DTB, a Frankfurt-based
exchange. This paper studies the determinants of the observed dynamics, using a novel panel dataset
that contains individual trading ￿rms￿membership status at each exchange together with other
￿rms characteristics, and pricing, marketing and product portfolio strategies by each exchange.
Our data allows us to distinguish between di⁄erent explanations for the observed phenomenon. Our
results indicate that the main driver was a "market coverage" e⁄ect: thanks to the combination
its electronic market structure and EU-wide access deregulation, DTB increased the relevant size
of the market for exchange members and disproportionately attracted those ￿rms who originally
did not exist or used to submit their orders through a broker. Di⁄erential liquidity and product
portfolio strategies by the exchanges played a secondary role.
JEL codes: G21, G28, L13, L43.
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June 2007Non-technical summary
In a famous episode of ￿nancial history that lasted over eight years, the market for the future on the
German long-term government bond, the Bund, moved entirely from LIFFE, a derivatives exchange
based in London, to DTB, a Frankfurt-based exchange. Since then, the "Battle of the Bund", as this
episode became known, has served to illustrate that ￿nancial markets can tip and thus, implicitly,
that competition is feasible and that there is a role for ￿rms￿strategies.
Liquidity matters in ￿nancial markets. This creates a tendency for trading to concentrate on a
single exchange and gives incumbent exchanges a ￿rst-mover advantage. For this reason, the Battle of
the Bund is a noteworthy example. However, exchanges di⁄er in other dimensions than liquidity. Na-
tional regulation, product portfolio, user convenience all provide scope for di⁄erentiation. Competition
and coexistence are possible when these other dimensions of exchange di⁄erentiation counterbalance
the incumbent￿ s liquidity advantage.
This paper is a ￿rst attempt at evaluating the contribution of these dimensions of di⁄erentiation to
the attractiveness of exchanges. Understanding the sources of exchange di⁄erentiation has implications
for exchange strategies, for competition policy, and, more generally, for the normative evaluation of
market structure in the exchange industry.
After brie￿ y describing the events and actions that took place during the Battle of the Bund, we
propose four non-exclusive explanations for the observed outcome. Each corresponds to a di⁄erent
source of trader heterogeneity. If traders value liquidity di⁄erently, DTB could have attracted early
on those traders who did not care so much about liquidity by charging them lower transaction fees.
As more traders joined DTB, the di⁄erence in liquidity between the two exchanges decreased and
new traders were attracted to DTB. A snowball e⁄ect resulted. Figure 1 can also be explained if
the exchanges were instead horizontally di⁄erentiated. Exchanges are multiproduct ￿rms. Even if
the Bund was the main product for both exchanges during this period, each exchange organized
markets for many other products. If traders have di⁄erent values for these other products, DTB could
have attracted those traders that preferred its product portfolio. Another dimension of horizontal
di⁄erentiation is geography-determined access costs. At the beginning of the decade, traders had to
have an o¢ ce in London to trade on LIFFE and they had to have an o¢ ce in Germany to trade on
DTB. Because DTB was an electronic exchange, remote access from other countries became possible as
access deregulation progressed. Finally, we consider the conjecture according to which DTB￿ s success
is the result of political pressure on German traders.
To examine these di⁄erent hypotheses empirically, we have collected a new panel dataset. Our
dataset contains all the establishments that were members of DTB or LIFFE at any point of time
between January 1990 to December 1999. For each of these establishments, we have tracked their
location, their inception and exit dates, their historical group a¢ liation, their business lines and the
products they traded. This allowed us to match establishments from di⁄erent locations at their group
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holding a single membership. Group a¢ liations and entry and exit histories also allow us to distinguish
between new memberships and membership resignations that are the results of organizational changes
(mergers, closure of one establishment, bankruptcy) and those that aren￿ t. We have also constructed
a dataset of exchange characteristics over the same period. For each exchange, we have their fee
structures, the value of the deposits required to guarantee the trades on that exchange, measures of
liquidity, the products traded, and a record of all events that could a⁄ect the decisions by traders to
trade on them. The end result is a panel dataset with ￿nancial groups￿monthly membership status
as a function of group and exchange characteristics.
Simple descriptive statistics of our data highlights four salient aspects of our environment. First, the
timing of DTB memberships di⁄ers signi￿cantly depending on the geographical presence of groups and
displays patterns consistent with the timing access deregulation. Second, the timing of DTB adoption
di⁄ers also accross groups with di⁄erent business lines in a way not captured by geography. Third, even
though some groups do not change membership status, 18% of our groups change membership status
more than twice even after controlling for changes in membership status due to internal organizational
changes (acquisition, mergers, bankruptcy, ...). Fourth, most of DTB new members were groups that
were not LIFFE members initially suggesting a story of newcomers rather than switchers.
Our econometric model for exchange choice incorporates these salient features. We assume that
groups choose every month whether to be a member of DTB, LIFFE, both exchanges or none of them.
Joining an exchange entails adoption costs that are geographically determined and vary with the state
of access deregulation. The rest of the payo⁄ to membership includes a component that is speci￿c to
the Bund (the variable pro￿t component) and one that consists of all the costs and bene￿ts conferred to
memberships beyond the Bund (the ￿xed pro￿t component). We allow for trader heterogeneity in the
variable pro￿t component by allowing groups having di⁄erent business lines to care about liquidity
di⁄erently (vertical di⁄erentiation). Trader heterogeneity also comes in the ￿xed pro￿t component
through exchange - business types - headquarter locations ￿xed e⁄ects.
The econometric results con￿rm the results obtained from simple descriptive statistics and provide
further insights into the mechanics of the Battle of the Bund. The story the data tells is one of
horizontal di⁄erentiation induced arti￿cially by national access barriers that came down following the
European Investment Services Directive and access deregulation in the US, with secondary roles played
by liquidity and product portfolio e⁄ects. These lower access costs increased the fraction of ￿nancial
￿rms across the EU that were members of an exchange and likely contributed to the success of the
Bund future as the dominant hedging instrument for long term interest rate products.
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In a famous episode of ￿nancial history that lasted over eight years, the market for the future on the
German long-term government bond, the Bund, moved entirely from LIFFE, a derivatives exchange
based in London, to DTB, a Frankfurt-based exchange (Figure 1 illustrates the market shares of the
traded volumes). Since then, the "Battle of the Bund", as this episode became known, has served
to illustrate that ￿nancial markets can tip and thus, implicitly, that competition is feasible and that
there is a role for ￿rms￿strategies.
Traders value liquidity in ￿nancial markets. This creates a tendency for trading to concentrate on
a single exchange and gives incumbent exchanges an advantage. Given this, the only way to explain
































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Market share of members and of Bund trading volume
After brie￿ y describing the events and actions that took place during the Battle of the Bund, we
propose four non-exclusive explanations for the observed outcome. Each corresponds to a di⁄erent
source of trader heterogeneity. If traders value liquidity di⁄erently, DTB could have attracted early
on those traders who did not care so much about liquidity by charging them lower transaction fees.
As more traders joined DTB, the di⁄erence in liquidity between the two exchanges decreased and
new traders were attracted to DTB. A snowball e⁄ect resulted. Figure 1 can also be explained if
the exchanges were instead horizontally di⁄erentiated. Exchanges are multiproduct ￿rms. Even if
the Bund was the main product for both exchanges during this period, each exchange organized
markets for many other products. If traders have di⁄erent values for these other products, DTB could
have attracted those traders that preferred its product portfolio. Another dimension of horizontal
di⁄erentiation is geography-determined access costs. At the beginning of the decade, traders had to
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DTB. Because DTB was an electronic exchange, remote access from other countries became possible as
access deregulation progressed. Finally, we consider the conjecture according to which DTB￿ s success
is the result of political pressure on German traders.
In this paper, we exploit a new panel dataset to evaluate the sources of trader heterogeneity and
study the determinants of the observed dynamics. Individual trading volumes are not observed, so we
focus on the observable traders￿choice of an exchange instead. While di⁄erent, trading decisions and
membership decisions are clearly connected (the dotted lines in Figure 1 represent the membership
shares of both exchanges).1 A trader must be a member to trade directly on an exchange. He must go
through a broker otherwise. When deciding to become a member of an exchange, traders trade-o⁄ the
￿xed costs of exchange membership with the lower marginal costs of trading that membership entails.
As a result, we argue that liquidity and other transaction costs a⁄ect both the decision of where to
trade and the decision of which exchange to join as a member. In addition, other factors a⁄ect the
decision to become a member of an exchange. These include adoption costs, ￿xed costs of membership
and the value traders attach to an exchange￿ s product portfolio.
Our dataset contains all the establishments that were members of DTB or LIFFE at any point of
time between January 1990 to December 1999. For each of these establishments, we have tracked their
location, their inception and exit dates, their historical group a¢ liation, their business lines and the
products they traded. This allowed us to match establishments from di⁄erent locations at their group
level and allows us to distinguish between groups holding memberships at both exchanges and groups
holding a single membership. Group a¢ liations and entry and exit histories also allow us to distinguish
between new memberships and membership resignations that are the results of organizational changes
(mergers, closure of one establishment, bankruptcy) and those that aren￿ t. We have also constructed
a dataset of exchange characteristics over the same period. For each exchange, we have their fee
structures, the value of the deposits required to guarantee the trades on that exchange, measures of
liquidity, the products traded, and a record of all events that could a⁄ect the decisions by traders to
trade on them. The end result is a panel dataset with ￿nancial groups￿monthly membership status
as a function of group and exchange characteristics.
Simple descriptive statistics of our data highlights four salient aspects of our environment. First, the
timing of DTB memberships di⁄ers signi￿cantly depending on the geographical presence of groups and
displays patterns consistent with the timing access deregulation. Second, the timing of DTB adoption
di⁄ers also accross groups with di⁄erent business lines in a way not captured by geography. Third, even
though some groups do not change membership status, 18% of our groups change membership status
more than twice even after controlling for changes in membership status due to internal organizational
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were not LIFFE members initially suggesting a story of newcomers rather than switchers.
Our econometric model for exchange choice incorporates these salient features. We assume that
groups choose every month whether to be a member of DTB, LIFFE, both exchanges or none of them.
Joining an exchange entails adoption costs that are geographically determined and vary with the state
of access deregulation. The rest of the payo⁄ to membership includes a component that is speci￿c to
the Bund (the variable pro￿t component) and one that consists of all the costs and bene￿ts conferred to
memberships beyond the Bund (the ￿xed pro￿t component). We allow for trader heterogeneity in the
variable pro￿t component by allowing groups having di⁄erent business lines to care about liquidity
di⁄erently (vertical di⁄erentiation). Trader heterogeneity also comes in the ￿xed pro￿t component
through exchange - business types - headquarter locations ￿xed e⁄ects.
Our preliminary ￿ndings are as follows. Access deregulation played an important role in helping
DTB attract newcomers. "Implicit" adoption costs, that is, the cost for new members to join an
exchange, beyond the explicit admission fees charged by the exchanges, were of the order of three to
four times larger than admission fees. Access deregulation reduced them signi￿cantly. We also found
evidence of heterogeneity in the match between traders and exchanges suggesting that other dimensions
of horizontal di⁄erentation beyond geography played a role. Finally, we found some evidence that
liquidity of the Bund market mattered when deciding which exchange to join. However, the coe¢ cients
are sensitive to the chosen speci￿cation and warrant further analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize how competition
between LIFFE and DTB played out. Section 3 discusses four possible stories that may have explained
the observed dynamics. We use these sections to motivate our empirical model and the data we
collected. Section 4 describes the data we collected. Section 5 introduces our benchmark empirical
model. Section 6 reports our results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Battle of the Bund
This section summarizes the relevant aspects of the competition between LIFFE and DTB. It moti-
vates the choice of data we collected, the hypotheses we consider for explaining the events and our
econometric model. Appendix B summarizes the key economics of futures trading for the readers not
familiar with the workings of derivatives markets.
The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) was established in
1982 as a member-owned exchange. Two hundred sixty one members were signed up at launch time,
a good third of them coming from outside the UK.2 Trading was initially organized exclusively by
open outcry. LIFFE￿ s ￿rst products were currency contracts, two short term interest rate contracts,
2Kynaston (1997), p. 71.
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trading progressively garnered pace after the exchange lowered transaction fees, negotiated a lowering
of margins costs with the clearing house, and encouraged participation by locals - individuals trading
on their own account. LIFFE introduced an automated trading platform (APT) in 1989 for electronic
trading outside the pit hours.
New products were progressively added, among them the Bund contract in September 1988. The
Bund launch was controversial. There was clearly a need for such a contract: the underlying cash
market was one of the biggest in the world, yet it did not have a proper hedging instrument. However,
German ￿nancial institutions were keen on developing such a market in Germany and they were
pushing for new laws that would make it possible to set up a derivatives exchange in Germany.
The Bund contract was an instant success on LIFFE. It was its second biggest contract within
6 months of its launch and became its top contract less than a year later. German banks used the
contract from the very beginning, providing up to a sixth of the volume according to an informal
LIFFE survey.3 An option on the Bund was added in April 1989.
Deutsche Terminb￿rse (DTB) was established in January 1990 by seventeen leading German banks.
Trading was conducted electronically from the very beginning. Unlike LIFFE, members did not own
shares or voting rights in DTB. Fifty members had joined at launch time, of which 80% were German
institutions. Its ￿rst products were an equity index future and 14 stock option contracts. After some
technical delays, DTB launched a Bund contract on November 23, 1990. The contract was essentially
identical to the LIFFE contract.4 Clearing was done by DKV, a German company.
The beginnings. Shortly before DTB￿ s launch of the Bund contract, LIFFE geared up for compe-
tition and trading was moved one hour earlier in order to match DTB￿ s hours. Grand declarations
were made in the press about where volume would go. In practice, the ￿rst days of trading on DTB
were very disappointing: volumes were low and participation seemed limited to German banks. It
became clear that much would depend on whether German banks would really be willing to trade on
DTB even if it were less liquid. By mid-1991, leading German banks with a stake in DTB signed a
Gentlemen￿ s agreement whereby they committed to support liquidity on DTB by acting as market
makers for the Bund. The Gentlemen￿ s agreement was e⁄ective and DTB￿ s market share climbed to
almost 20% by mid-July. The commitment by the German banks was strengthened in November when
they committed to speci￿c volume targets.
Competition in the product space. The battleground between LIFFE and DTB quickly moved
to the product space. While the Bund was clearly the key product, each exchange tried to reinforce
the contract by o⁄ering complementary products and services. Thus, DTB launched an option on
the Bund in August 1991, and it started a Bobl contract, a future on the medium-term German
3Kynaston (1997), pp. 218-219.
4Breedon (1996) studies the di⁄erences between the two contracts in details and their likely impact on prices.
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DTB launched an option on the Bobl. Finally, DTB launched the Schatz contract, a future on the
short-term German government bond in March 1997. Each of these product launches was accompanied
by statements by the exchanges suggesting that Bund traders would be interested in these products.
DTB￿ s Bobl turned out to be a hit in its own right (LIFFE￿ s version was a failure). However, the
Bund remained the dominant contract and it is not clear to what extent these products attracted new
traders on the exchanges, instead of simply bene￿tting from the positive spillovers from the Bund
contract.
New services were also o⁄ered to boost trading in the Bund. LIFFE launched a basis-trade facility
where traders could trade simultaneously the Bund future and its cash equivalent in July 1995, followed
by DTB in October of the same year. LIFFE launched a spread facility where traders could buy a
Bobl and sell a Bund (or the other way round) simultaneously in February 1994, followed by DTB in
May 1997.
Access. DTB￿ s electronic market did not in principle require members to be based in Germany.
However, futures traders and exchanges were regulated by their national supervisory authorities (e.g.
the Securities and Futures Authority in the UK or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in
the US). DTB had to be recognized as an exchange in other countries for the trading ￿rms in these
countries to be allowed to trade on DTB, and likelwise, these ￿rms had to be recognized as investment
￿rms in Germany to be able to trade on a German exchange. Thus, initially, only ￿rms with an o¢ ce
in Germany could trade on DTB.
DTB seemed to have realized early on that access was critical.5 In December 1993, it signed an
agreement with the French derivatives exchange MATIF whereby MATIF members would be able to
trade the Bund and Bobl on DTB. The agreement came into force in September 1994, at the same
time as Dutch regulatory authorities authorized proprietary traders based in the Netherlands to trade
on DTB. DTB also actively lobbied US and British regulatory authorities to allow remote access from
the US and the UK, two important sources of trading volumes. Those e⁄orts resulted in a no-action
letter issued on 29 February 1996 by the CFTC allowing US-based traders to trade on DTB. DTB￿ s
e⁄orts with the British authorities were unsuccessful. In the meantime, the European Union approved
the Investment Services Directive. The Directive, which came into force in January 1996, implied that
any exchange and investment ￿rm authorized and regulated in one of the European Union countries
would be recognized and authorized in all the other countries. From then on, EU-based trading ￿rms
could have remote access to DTB.
As an open outcry exchange for most of 1990s, LIFFE members were essentially forced to have
sta⁄ in London making access and regulatory approval a lower priority for LIFFE. Yet, ￿nancial
regulations in other countries did also a⁄ect trading on LIFFE because trading in the Bund took place
5"DTB may put screens outside Germany", Financial Times, 23 January 1991.
on an electronic platform after-hours until August 1998 and was entirely electronic after that.
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ments seemed to have been very successful nor conducive to higher trading volumes in the Bund at
LIFFE. For example, in March 1997, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) started trading the Bund
in its pits and LIFFE started trading the long term T-bill, one of CBOT￿ s key products. The idea
was to o⁄er longer overall trading hours for the Bund and the T-bills. However, traders could also
trade those products on the exchanges￿respective after-hour electronic trading platforms and trading
volumes in the pits were low. The link was abandoned in December 1997.
Electronic trading versus open outcry. There was a fair amount of discussion in the industry
at the time on the relative advantages of open outcry versus electronic trading. It was argued that
open outcry markets were better at aggregating information in periods of high volatility and that they
allowed for more complex strategies than electronic markets. Electronic trading, it was argued, was
signi￿cantly cheaper: a single broker could be in contact with clients and input orders in the market
whereas open outcry required a ￿ oor-broker on top of the broker in contact with clients, transactions
were automatically processed through clearing, and so on.
Breedon and Holland (1998) summarize the evidence on the relative quality of the Bund market at
both exchanges. Using di⁄erent measures of spreads (the di⁄erence between the buy price and the sell
price) and transaction prices, they ￿nd that "realized" liquidity was similar in both markets around
1995. However, transaction sizes on LIFFE were more than double the size of transactions at DTB,
suggesting DTB might have been less liquid, had transaction sizes been as large as on LIFFE. They
also found that volumes tended to migrate to LIFFE in periods of high volatility.
Macroeconomic developments. Trading volumes of the Bund grew ￿fteen-fold during the 1990s.
Several factors contributed to this. First, German reuni￿cation in 1990 increased Germany￿ s borrowing
needs. The resulting increase in the public debt fueled interest in the future contract. Second, interest
rates in the eurozone progressively converged as monetary union took shape (the euro - which ￿xed
exchange rates among participating countries - was introduced on 1 January 1999). As a result, the
Bund contract, which was the biggest future on a government bond in Europe progressively attracted
traders from other government bond futures. Third, futures went from exotic ￿nancial instruments
to common investment and hedging instruments used routinely by banks, asset management funds
and corporations. The ensuing pool of liquidity attracted speculators and arbitrageurs of all kinds.
Increased volumes may have played in favor of DTB by decreasing the relative di⁄erence in liquidity
between the two markets.
Mergers. Both exchanges underwent mergers during the 1990s. LIFFE merged with the London
Traded Options Market (LTOM), an equity option exchange, in 1992. It merged with the London
Commodity Exchange in 1996. DTB became part of Deutsche B￿rse, the Frankfurt-based stock
exchange, in August 1994. It merged with the Swiss derivatives exchange SOFFEX in September
12
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instantaneously to DTB. The new entity took the name of Eurex.
The loss of the Bund. Between 1992 and 1996, DTB￿ s share of the Bund trading remained virtually
unchanged at 30% (Figure 1). Things started to change at the end of 1996. The Investment Services
Directive had come into force and, during 1996, DTB installed access points in Amsterdam, Chicago
and Zurich for easy access to its market. In August 1997, DTB extended its trading hours to match
those of LIFFE and in September 1997, a price war broke out with both exchanges waiving transaction
fees on the Bund. A sixth of DTB￿ s members were now based in London and DTB opened an o¢ ce
there to facilitate contacts and new traders training.
The exchanges were head-to-head by the last quarter of 1997: LIFFE was still ahead in September,
but DTB took the lead and they ￿nished the year with an almost equal market share. Things went
very fast afterwards. LIFFE completely restructured its fee structure in March 1998 in the hope
to boost its appeal. During that time, DTB maintained the pressure: it wrote a letter to LIFFE￿ s
members o⁄ering a computer and DTB￿ s trading software to any members willing to trade on DTB.
DTB also ran an advertising campaign in all major newspapers o⁄ering its trading system to LIFFE
for free. By mid-July, it was clear that LIFFE had lost the Bund. Late 1998, LIFFE unveiled a
new contract, the DM-denominated Libor-Financed-Bond aimed at challenging the Bund￿ s dominance
of the long term part of the yield curve. The new contract never took o⁄. LIFFE underwent a
complete restructuring following the loss of the Bund. It demutualized in February 1999 and became
an all-electronic exchange.
3 Four stories
Traders incur several costs on each contract traded: transaction fees, margins and price impact costs.
First, they pay a transaction fee to the exchange. Second, for each new open position a trader has,
margins must be deposited at the clearing house to guarantee the trade. LIFFE￿ s clearing house paid
an interest on these margins but DTB￿ s clearing house did not. Moreover, even when margins accrue
interests, this return may be much lower than what a trader could generate elsewhere. Thus, margins
generate an opportunity cost. Third, a trader may in￿ uence the price of the future when trying to
buy or sell large quantities. The impact cost of a transaction is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the
theoretical "equilibrium price" for the contract at the time of the transaction and the realized price
for the transaction. Impact costs are related to the liquidity of a market. The more liquid a market
is, the less speci￿c orders a⁄ect prices.
Everything else equal, traders prefer to trade in more liquid markets: liquidity - essentially a
corollary to trading volumes - implies lower impact costs and thus ultimately lower trading costs.
This creates a tendency for trading to concentrate on a single exchange and gives an advantage to
13
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opportunity cost of money, trading behavior, value for the other products traded by each exchange and
adoption costs. These sources of trader heterogeneity create an opportunity for an entrant exchange
to attract trades. This suggests four possible (and non exclusive) stories for the observed pattern.
Story 1: Vertical di⁄erentiation. According to this story, the main source of di⁄erentiation
between the two exchanges was liquidity. LIFFE being the incumbent o⁄ered a larger liquidity pool
to traders. However, it was also intrinsically more expensive, both due to its fee structure and its
market organization. When selecting an exchange, traders traded o⁄ the higher liquidity of LIFFE
with DTB￿ s lower costs as in Pagano (1989). Traders with low liquidity needs - essentially traders
with smaller transactions - were predominently attracted to DTB. The fact that traded volumes also
grew during that period further contributed to a decrease in the di⁄erence of liquidity between the two
exchanges - even holding market shares constant. The resulting increase of DTB￿ s liquidity eventually
triggered a snowball e⁄ect, leading to the complete reversal in market share.
A variant on this story is that traders￿cost of margins was the main source of di⁄erentiation and
that DTB had lower margins requirements. Thus traders with high costs of margins - either because
they had high opportunity costs of money or because they tended to keep positions open during
longer periods - migrated to DTB. Further decreases in DTB margins attracted more traders, until
DTB o⁄ered a lower cost of trading for all types of traders. This variant is easily ruled out on the
basis of our data: on average, margins were higher on DTB than on LIFFE.
Story 2: Horizontal di⁄erentiation I. According to this story, the main source of di⁄erentiation
between the two exchanges was their product portfolio and DTB was more dynamic and successful
than LIFFE in trading products that also attracted Bund traders. The description in section 2 suggests
that both exchanges attempted strategies motivated by this story.
Story 3: Horizontal di⁄erentiation II. According to this story, the main source of di⁄erentiation
between the two exchanges was their geographically determined access costs. Access deregulation in
the EU combined with the fact that DTB was an electronic exchange lowered the cost of access to
DTB and increased the size of market for exchange members. Traders who originally used brokers
to trade the Bund could now a⁄ord a membership at DTB. This increased trading volumes on DTB.
Bessler, Book and Preu￿ (2006) make an argument along these lines. They argue that scalability of
electronic trading, enhanced by access deregulation, is what gave DTB a de￿nite advantage in the
Battle of the Bund.
Story 4: Non economic factors. Several industry participants suggested that political forces rather
than economic forces led to the market share reversal. In the words of one of them: "German banks
had a gun on their heads to trade on DTB."
Note that none of the stories assumes that exchanges acted optimally as the dynamics played out.
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exchange (this is the case for story 2, and for story 1 if the cost di⁄erential between the two exchanges
is not too big).
The four stories also di⁄er in the role of switchers (traders who were initially members of LIFFE
and who switched to DTB) and newcomers (traders who were not members of any exchange). Stories
2 and 4 are essentially stories of switchers, whereas story 3 is a story about newcomers driving the
observed phenomenon. Story 1 is consistent with both switchers and newcomers.
Finally, the four stories are non exclusive. In fact, except for story 2, some elements of story 1
(liquidity matters) must also hold to explain the complete tipping in the Bund trading.
4 Data
This section describes the dataset we collected and provides preliminary evidence on the sources of
variation in our analysis.
4.1 Exchange data
For both exchanges and for the period between 1 September 1990 until 31 December 1999, we col-
lected the following monthly data: (1) admission fee to the exchange, (2) annual membership fee,
(3) transaction and clearing fee per contract, (4) initial and maintenance margins,6 (5) membership,
(6) product launches and delisting, and (7) traded volume in the Bund contract. Fees, margins and
product launches and delisting were collected from exchange notices to members, membership was
computed on the basis of the information provided to us by both exchanges, and volume data come
from Datastream.
In addition, we combined internal sources of information (press releases, notices and circulars to
members, records of changes in the rules of the market) and external sources of information (search
on Factiva) to identify events of potential consequences for Bund traders. Speci￿cally, we tracked
the following events: (1) regulatory changes concerning access and recognition in other countries, (2)
marketing campaigns not re￿ ected in the fee structure such as free hardware or free installation, (3)
technological changes such as the opening of access points.
The conversion to the euro takes place during our sample period (1 January 1999) and both ex-
changes introduced a Euro-denominated Bund contract towards the end of 1998. We use the Deutsche
Mark as the currency for all the data. Fees are converted into DM using the monthly average exchange
rate for the Pound/DM, and the ￿xed conversion rate for the euro/DM. The size of the Bund contract
6Initial margins are those margins required at the opening of the position. As time passes, the clearing house credits or
debits the initial margin depending on the evolution of the future contract. If margins go below the level of maintenance
margins, the clearing house calls on the trader to deposit additional margins.
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DM equivalent). Trade volumes and transaction fees were all scaled accordingly. Maturities for the
Bund are quarterly and generate three-month cycles in trading volumes. We smooth out these cycles
by considering three-month averages for volumes instead of monthly volumes.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our exchange variables for the period between 1 November
1990 and 1 March 1999 which corresponds to the period during which competition between the two
exchanges was e⁄ective. The number of month observations is 101.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the exchange dataset
LIFFE DTB
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Mean Std.Dev Min Max
admission fee 0 0 0 0 87000 36303.18 0 102000
￿xed fee 9246.34 941.06 7707 10839.15 29000 12101.06 0 34000
transaction fee 0.94 0.30 0 1.30 0.52 0.36 0 1.50
margins 2983.34 858.13 1500 6250 3579.33 929.84 2000 5000
volume 2.11 106 1.24 106 0 4.11 106 1.97 106 2.55 106 0 10.6 106
log(vol) 5.98 1.21 0 6.70 5.93 0.83 0 7.03
1/volume 0.08 0.27 2.43 10￿7 1.00 0.02 0.13 0.90 10￿7 1.00
members7 147.94 3.79 141 156 122.38 64.15 62 309
group members8 125.97 2.93 121 135 106.02 45.64 60 232
In practice, neither exchange seemed to have used admission and ￿xed fees to lure new members.
LIFFE did not charge an admission fee (but members had to buy a share in the exchange) and annual
fees were constant during the entire sample period. DTB charged a 102,000 DM admission fee and a
34,000 DM ￿xed fee until December 1997, after which both fees were waived. There was more activity
on the transaction fee front. Although transaction fees were originally higher on DTB, DTB quickly
undercut LIFFE. When the market was tipping at the end of 1997, a price war broke down and both
exchanges waived transaction fees entirely. LIFFE waived again its fees several times afterwards.
Table 1 also suggests that, if anything, the costs of margins favored LIFFE rather than DTB:
margins were on average higher on DTB than on LIFFE. Moreover, LIFFE paid an interest on the
deposited margins. Thus, this variant of story 1 can safely be discarded. Table 1 distinguishes between
individual memberships and memberships held by establishments under the same ownership, which is
actually the data we used in our econometric analysis (see next section). Both numbers display the
same pattern. They con￿rm that LIFFE was an established exchange by the early 1990s, with a stable
membership, unlike the newly established DTB.
7LIFFE membership numbers are restricted to those allowed to trade interest rate instruments.
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We have obtained from each exchange a list of past and current members, with their names, mnemonic
code, and start and end dates of membership. In addition, the DTB data contain the country and city
location of these members and the LIFFE data contain the instrument class (equities, commodities
or ￿nancials) that the member can trade. For current members, we also have the address of the
establishment.
The original data from DTB contain information on 493 individual establishments that held a
membership any time during the 1 January 1990 - 31 December 1999 period. The original data from
LIFFE contain information on 305 individual establishments that held a membership allowing them to
trade ￿nancial instruments (including the Bund) any time during the 1 January 1990 - 31 December
1999 period. Sixty-six individual establishments appear in both datasets. This means our data cover
732 individual establishments.
For each member (establishment), we have collected additional information on (1) their (histor-
ical) group a¢ liation including mergers and acquisitions, (2) the establishment inception date and,
if applicable, its closing date, (3) the group inception date and, if applicable, its bankruptcy date,
(4) the activities of the establishment, and (5) whether the establishment trades the Bund or any
other long-term government bond derivatives. This information was collected manually following the
procedure described in Appendix A.
This process allowed us to track the needed information on most but not all establishments.
Inception dates are missing for 110 (15.0%) of the individual establishments and 59 groups (10.15%).
We could establish whether individual establishments traded the Bund contract or any other long-term
government bond future in 78.3% of the cases. We assign the month prior to joining any of the two
exchanges as the default establishment and group inception dates when these are missing, and we
consider that the establishment trades the Bund when we do not know. We consider di⁄erent default
values when we do our robustness checks.
Groups versus individual establishments. We face three issues when de￿ning the proper unit of
observation in our environment. First, establishments can be endogenous to the decision to join an
exchange. Prior to September 1994, traders had to have an o¢ ce in Germany to be able to trade on
DTB. Similarly, traders had to have a presence in London to trade on LIFFE before August 1998.
Second, membership decisions of individual establishments that belong to the same group are not
independent, and largely depend on the group￿ s internal organization. Some groups are organized
along geographical lines, with trading desks in each country. Others are organized along business lines
with a single trading division. In the ￿rst case, all geographical trading divisions could, in principle,
be members of a given exchange. In the second case, we would observe only one membership for that
group. Third, mergers and acquisitions can lead to membership resignations because the resulting
entity rationalizes its membership and not because the resigning establishment no longer values the
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the collected information on group ownership and mergers and acquisitions to match establishments
to groups. With this convention, our dataset covers 578 groups. On average, 362.64 groups are present
in any given month (min = 315, max = 433, std deviation = 32.66).
Business models. We partitioned the establishments and the groups in our dataset into seven
business model categories: universal bank, investment bank, retail bank, specialized trading ￿rm,
asset management, brokerage and proprietary trading ￿rm. We distinguished banks by the type of
customers they serve. Retail banks serve primarily individual customers as well as small and medium
enterprises. Investment banks serve corporate clients as well as, often, wealthy individuals. Universal
banks serve all types of customers.
For most of their activities, investment banks compete with more focused ￿nancial ￿rms. Table 2
summarizes the main activities of an investment bank (IB): underwriting and mergers & acquisitions,
market making, brokerage services, asset management and proprietary trading. Specialized trading
￿rms compete with investment banks by making markets, o⁄ering execution and/or clearing for insti-
tutional clients, and trading on their own account. Asset management ￿rms sometimes o⁄er brokerage
services to a retail clientele and trade on their own account on top of their core asset management
activity. Brokerages o⁄er execution services and sometimes also o⁄er some funds. Proprietary trading
￿rms are ￿rms that focus on trading on their own account. Table 2 compares the activities covered by
these ￿rms. In categorizing our ￿rms, we have assigned the smallest encompassing category for each
group. Thus a group active in market making, proprietary trading and asset management would be
classi￿ed as an IB, but a group active in asset management and proprietary trading would be classi￿ed
as an asset management ￿rm and a group active in proprietary trading and market making would be
classi￿ed as a specialized trading ￿rm.
Table 2: Investment banks and their competitors




















Business types proxy for three things in our dataset. They proxy for size because universal banks
tend to be larger than retail banks and investment banks on average, and investment banks tend to
be bigger than more specialized ￿nancial ￿rms. Some proprietary trading ￿rms are one or two people
operations. Business types also proxy for trading motives and sources of revenue, and thus eventually
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on the basis of a fee in return. Their value added lies in providing access to exchanges and they will
thus be interested in exchanges that organize markets in the instruments their clients need. At the
other extreme, proprietary trading ￿rms are only interested that the exchange o⁄ers the product(s)
they speculate on. Relatedly, business types proxy for the scope of products traded. Finally, business
types are likely to proxy for traders￿transaction sizes and thus value for liquidity.
Evaluated at the time a group ￿rst appears in our dataset, our data contain 64 universal banks,
28 retail banks, 102 investment banks, 48 asset management ￿rms, 95 specialized trading ￿rms, 110
brokerages and 131 proprietary trading ￿rms.
Geographical presence. Geographical presence a⁄ected adoption costs depending on the state of
access deregulation. In our sample, 127 groups have their headquarters (HQ) in Germany, 37 have
their HQ in Switzerland, 116 in the UK, 149 in the rest of Europe, 108 in the US and 41 in the rest
of the world. We have also constructed a variable that records a group￿ s geographical presence in
any given month based on the locations of its headquarters and its known subsidiaries in that month.
This variable underestimates the geographical presence of the group because it is mainly based on the
group￿ s establishments that were members of one or the other exchange at some point during 1990-
2000 (there are few exceptions when tracking a speci￿c establishment, we learned about the opening or
the existence of an establishment in another country). However, we believe our geographical presence
accurately records the useful information because a group eventually joins an exchange from the most
convenient location and these establishments are in our dataset.
4.3 Evidence on the sources of trader heterogeneity
Section 3 suggested four sources of trader heterogeneity in our environment: di⁄erent traders have
di⁄erent adoption costs, di⁄erent traders trade di⁄erent sets of products and thus value the exchanges￿
product portfolios di⁄erently, di⁄erent traders care about margins costs di⁄erently because they have
di⁄erent trading behaviors, and some traders care more about liquidity than others.
In practice, our measures of groups￿characteristics are their headquarter location, their geograph-
ical presence and their business type. Because of the way deregulation worked, geographical presence
clearly captures di⁄erential adoption costs. Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution function of the
time at which groups joined DTB as a function of their "closest" geographical presence three months
before joining.9 In de￿ning "closest" geographical presence, we considered that Germany was closest,
followed by France and the Netherlands, followed by Switzerland, followed by the UK, followed by
other EU countries, followed by the US and ￿nally by the rest of the world. Thus, for example, the
closest geographical presence of a group with establishments in the UK, France and the rest of the
world will be France.
9We consider their geographical presence three months before joining to ensure it is exogenous to the decision to join.
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Figure 1: DTB joining time according to closest geographical presence
Figure 1 shows that our geographical presence variable captures one important aspect by which
groups di⁄er. Geographical presence a⁄ects both the volume of early DTB members (30% of groups
with a German presence had joined by January 1990 whereas it took a year for groups without an initial
German presence to join DTB) as well as the dynamics of the timing of adoption (many groups with
a French or Dutch join after the deregulation of access from the Netherlands and France in September
1994; likewise, membership from groups based in Switserland jumps around the time of the merger
with SOFFEX). Yet, it is also clear that geographical presence does not entirely capture the timing
of adoption. Figure 1 shows that groups with an English presence but no German, French or Dutch
presence came in earlier than groups with a European presence outside of Germany, France, Holland
and the UK despite the fact that those groups were in principle a⁄ected equally by deregulation.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distribution function of the time at which groups joined DTB, by
business category. Again the ￿gure suggests di⁄erences in the timing of DTB membership. There
seem to be two types of retail banks and asset management ￿rms: those that joined DTB at the very
beginning, and those that joined at the end of the decade. Very few joined in-between. By contrast,
most of the new members circa 1995-1996 were specialized trading ￿rms and proprietary trading ￿rms.
Brokerages followed suit but later.
Table 3 describes the relationship between closest geographical presence and business types. It
shows that the two variables capture di⁄erent sources of heterogeneity. For example, the fact that
proprietary ￿rms came in later than specialized trading ￿rms cannot be explained by geography alone.
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Figure 2: DTB joining times according to business type
Table 3: Relationship between closest geographical presence and business types
Closest geo presence Universal Retail IB Specialized Asset Mgt Propr Brokerage
Germany 31 12 42 18 16 53 19
France or NL 3 0 6 26 2 14 13
Switzerland 3 2 1 2 20 1 2
UK 19 7 48 45 1 48 50
Rest of EU 8 7 6 1 8 3 18
US 0 0 0 3 1 12 8
ROW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 64 28 102 95 48 131 110
As a ￿nal piece of evidence of trader heterogeneity, Table 4 reports the average probability for
a group of a given business type to be a member of LIFFE or DTB. It is de￿ned as the average
proportion of groups of that business type that are members of LIFFE or DTB across all months in
the sample (standard deviations in parenthesis).
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Proba on DTB Proba on LIFFE
Universal 0.46 (0.14) 0.43 (0.02)
Retail 0.25 (0.14) 0.14 (0.04)
IB 0.31 (0.21) 0.37 (0.06)
Asset Mgt 0.30 (0.20) 0.02 (0.01)
Specialized 0.43 (0.11) 0.63 (0.04)
Proprietary 0.19 (0.14) 0.29 (0.15)
Brokerage 0.12 (0.17) 0.29 (0.5)
4.4 Switchers versus newcomers, and evidence of lock-in
Table 1 already suggested that DTB experienced an increase in membership whereas membership at
LIFFE remained almost constant during the 1990s. A ￿rst question we can answer on the basis of
our data (since we have tracked group ownership) is to what extent the increase in DTB membership
was driven by traders switching from DTB to LIFFE (or, more plausibly given Table 1, joining DTB
on top of LIFFE), rather than by newcomers choosing predominantly DTB. To answer this question,
we build a panel data of groups￿membership status over the 120 month period between 1 January
1990 till 31 December 99.10 Thus an observation is a group-month observation. For each group-
month observation, we record the group￿ s membership status in the previous month and the current
membership status.
Figure 3 summarizes the resulting transition matrix. DTB￿ s success seems largely due to newcom-
ers. Newcomers predominantly chose DTB at a ratio of almost 4 to 1: Out of the 361 groups that
were not members of either exchange at the beginning of the sample, 285 chose DTB.11 There were
at most 11 "switchers" from LIFFE to DTB (a switcher would have ￿rst joined DTB generating a
LIFFE-Both transition, and then resigned from LIFFE, generating a Both-DTB transition). If we
also consider those groups that added a DTB membership to their LIFFE membership, the number
10A group is present in the data from its inception date until its exit date (acquisition, merger or bankruptcy). A
group is a member of an exchange as soon as one establishment belonging to the group is a member
11This number is somewhat exaggerated because we consider the period 1/90 till 9/99 and DTB was set up in January
1990. This boosts the number of newcomers by about 50 right there independently of the Bund. We should recompute
this matrix to take this into account.
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Figure 3: Transitions in full dataset
(1/99 - 12/99)
The total number of transitions is 589. Given that our dataset controls for group ownership and group
entries and exits, these transitions can be attributed to changes in the value that the ￿rms assign to
the exchanges.12 Among the 578 groups present in our data, 97 never change membership status over
the entire period during which they are present, 372 change status once, 92 change status twice and
11 change status three times and 6 change status four times. Approximately 18 % of groups undergo
at least two changes of status. This is not a trivial number. It motivates our empirical model where
￿rms decide to join or quit exchanges at all times.
As an additional perspective on newcomers, Figure 4 plots the number of groups that were mem-
bers of LIFFE, BOTH, DTB or no exchange over time. The area at the bottom represents the group
membership at LIFFE only. The second area from the bottom represents membership at both ex-
changes. The third area corresponds to DTB-only members. The top area corresponds to those groups
that are not members of any exchange. Figure 4 shows both the increase in the size of the market
for exchange members and the increase in the proportion of these groups that are members of an
exchange.
5 Benchmark model
This section introduces our benchmark empirical model, discusses its microfoundations, and how we
address the econometric issues that the model and the data raise.
12Put di⁄erently, membership resignations due to bankruptcies or membership rationalization following a merger are
not counted in this number. Likewise, decisions by groups to add another membership from another location in addition
to their existing membership are also not counted. For comparison, the number of transitions would be equal to 1,019 if
we did not correct for those and took establishment memberships as our unit of observation.
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Figure 4: Exchange members and non members over time
5.1 Model
We assume that trading ￿rms reconsider every month which exchange(s) they want to be a member of,
based on their expected pro￿t from membership. Traders can be a member of one or both exchanges,
or not be a member of any exchange.
Formally, let i 2 I = f1;:::;Ig denote a trading ￿rm, s 2 S = funiversal bank, retail bank, IB,
specialized trading ￿rm, proprietary trading ￿rm, asset management, brokerage} denotes the type
of business it does, and t denotes time. Let !it describe the membership status of ￿rm i at time t;
!it 2 fD;L;B;0g standing for DTB, LIFFE, BOTH and NONE respectively. Firm i￿ s pro￿t from
membership at exchange k at time t can be decomposed into a ￿xed component, a component that
varies with trading volumes, and an adoption cost (in case ￿rm i was not a member of exchange k in
the previous period): Thus we let ￿rm i￿ s expected pro￿t from being a member of exchange k at time
t be:
￿it(k;!it￿1) = Fit(k) + V ARit(k) ￿ Ait(k;!it￿1) (1)
where Fit(k) and V ARit(k) are ￿rm i￿ s ￿xed and variable components of pro￿t due to its membership
at exchange k and Ait(k;!it￿1) stands for ￿rm i￿ s adoption cost for exchange k given that it was a
member of exchange !it￿1 in the previous period. We normalize ￿it(0;!it￿1) = 0:
Fixed pro￿ts. The ￿xed component of pro￿ts is made of the exchanges￿￿xed fee, a speci￿c term for
each exchange, business-type and HQ location, an exchange speci￿c time trend, and a random shock
to the value of exchange membership:
Fit(k) = ￿1FIXEDkt + ￿2skHQ + ￿3kTIME + "ikt (2)
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cost and revenue components to exchange membership. The term ￿2skHQ captures any time-invariant
match quality between a ￿rm and exchange k: It may be due to exchange k￿ s product portfolio or
reporting practice or any other unobservable cost or revenue component speci￿c to that exchange. We
impose that all ￿rms with the same headquarter location and business types have the same match
quality: This yields 126 coe¢ cients. Controlling for headquarter location, rather than geographical
presence, will allow us to identify any nationalistic bias if it exists. The coe¢ cients on the time trend
vary with the exchange because technological progress, labor costs, and so on, a⁄ected exchanges
di⁄erently.
Variable pro￿ts. The variable component of pro￿ts is a function the ability of trader i to turn
trades into revenue, trader i￿ s opportunity cost of margins and the exchange￿ s transaction fee and
liquidity (through the impact cost). Because these variables impact a trading ￿rm￿ s pro￿t di⁄erently
depending on its trading behavior (see appendix B for details, and the next subsection for some
microfoundations), we assume it takes the following form:
VARit(k) = ￿1iFEEkt + ￿2iMARGINSkt + ￿3iLIQUIDITYkt + ￿it k = D;L (3)
For k = B;
VARit(B) = ￿1i(FEEDt + FEELt) + ￿2i(MARGINSDt + MARGINSLt) (4)
+￿4iLIQUIDITYBt
Adoption costs. Adoption costs depend on the admission fee charged by the exchange and on the
time and geography-varying adoption costs borne by traders to prepare for membership (opening of
an o¢ ce, organization of the back o¢ ce, traders￿training and so on).
Ait(k;!it￿1) = (￿1ADMkt + D(i￿ s most favorable location given k and t))1fi must bear adoption cost}
(5)
where D is a dummy variable constructed for each location and time period during which a relevant
access regulation regime was in place. For traders with multiple locations, we take the a priori most
favorable one and check ex-post that the estimation are consistent with that assumption (See appendix
A for details). To avoid an endogeneity bias due to the possibility of the opening of an establishment
at the same time as a ￿rm joins an exchange, we consider the geographical presence of ￿rms at t ￿ 3
to consider D:
At time t ￿ 1; trading ￿rms decide on their membership status for period t. We observe
!it = k if k = arg max
k02fD;L;B;0g
￿it(k0;!it￿1) (6)
Firms are myopic. They take time t ￿ 1 values into account to evaluate their expected payo⁄ from
each option. In other words, they play a best response to the previous period observed payo⁄ and
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nous events or following membership decisions by other ￿rms.13 An alternative interpretation is that
￿rms are forward-looking but that current values for the independent variables capture entirely their
expectations about the future. The coe¢ cients should interpreted accordingly.
5.2 Microfoundations
Our application has two distinctive features relative to standard models of technology adoption. The
￿rst distinctive feature is that exchange membership is not necessary to trade on a market: a trader
can always use a broker to access an exchange. The second distinctive feature is that traders can
(and do) become members of both exchanges. We now discuss the microfoundations of (1)-(5) and
interpretation of the model￿ s coe¢ cients.
We ￿rst consider the feature that consists in exchange membership not being necessary for trading.
Why and how should liquidity matter then? If a trader trades exactly the same amount whether he is a
member or not, the only di⁄erence membership makes is that the trader avoids the broker￿ s commission
but must pay the exchange￿ s ￿xed fee. A trader trading large volumes will choose membership, whereas
occasional traders will opt for the broker. With our normalization of the payo⁄ to NONE to zero,
this would imply V ARit(k) = volitBROKERFEEt where volit is trader i￿ s exogenous trading volume
at time t.14 Liquidity would not matter. Margins and fees would not matter either.
In practice, exchange members trade more than non members because they can take advantage of
arbitrage or speculation opportunities that would be unpro￿table with a brokerage fee. Even exchange
members who earn a pro￿t from commission rather than trading pro￿ts are likely to trade more than
non members because they can price their services more competitively. When trading volumes di⁄er,
liquidity (and margins and fees) a⁄ect a trader￿ s variable pro￿t even after normalization. Formally,
let volit be trader i￿ s trading volume if he is not a member of an exchange at time t and let volikt be
his trading volume if he is a member of exchange k: Suppose trader i generates an average revenue
of ￿i on each contract traded. Then, trader i￿ s variable pro￿ts to being a member of exchange
k are (after normalization): (volikt￿ volit)(￿i￿ FEEkt￿ COST_MARGINSkt￿ IMPACT_COSTkt)+
volitBROKERFEEt: Suppose (volikt￿ volit) is only a function of i. Then VARit(k) takes the form of
(3) and the interpretation for ￿it is that it collects the extra revenue from an exchange membership
and the broker fee term: ￿it = (volikt￿volit)￿i+ volitBROKERFEEt: The ￿ coe¢ cients incorporate
(volikt￿volit); the extra volume generated from being an exchange member. In other words, our
13This approach is in the spirit of Arthur (1989) and Auriol and Benaim (2000) for environments of technology adoption
with network externalities, and more generally with the learning in games literature.
14Indeed, the variable costs from being a member of exchange k are given by volit(FEEkt+ COST_MARGINSkt+
IMPACT_COSTkt): The variable costs incurred if trader i is not a member of any exchange is
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volume does not vary across time or exchange.
We now consider the value for dual membership. Suppose a trader trades su¢ ciently high volumes
that the cost of membership at one exchange is justi￿ed. Our model allows for two reasons why such
a trader may want to be a member of both exchanges. First, dual membership allows a trader to send
his trades where total transaction costs are cheapest at any given time. This explains our functional
form for variable pro￿ts from dual membership (4) where we allow a di⁄erent coe¢ cient on liquidity
than in (3). Second, dual members bene￿t from all the products traded on both exchanges without
the intermediation of a broker. This will be all the more valuable that there is little overlap between
the exchanges￿other products and that the trader is interested in those. This e⁄ect is captured by
allowing ￿2sBHQ to be di⁄erent from ￿2sDHQ + ￿2sLHQ and a distinct time trend coe¢ cient.
5.3 Estimation
We can rewrite traders￿pro￿t function as follows:
￿it(k;wit￿1) = ￿iXikt + "ikt + ￿it; k 2 fD;L;Bg (7)
￿it(0;wit￿1) = 0
Expression (7) raises two issues for estimation. First, without further restriction, ￿it is not separately
identi￿ed from the coe¢ cients on other time-varying variables. In other words, if we estimated ￿it as a
￿xed e⁄ect we would need to drop all other time-varying variables from the estimation. Recall that the
time-varying part of ￿it is equal to volitBROKERFEEt and that the time-invariant part is proportional
to the extra volume of trading generated by membership. As a ￿rst step in our empirical analysis, we
consider that these aspects are captured by the time trend and the business-type-HQ-exchange ￿xed
e⁄ects, and thus ignore ￿it in the estimation.
The second issue concerns the trader-speci￿c coe¢ cients ￿i: As a ￿rst step we constrain them to
be equal across business types. In that case, if we assume that "ikt are i.i.d. extreme value, we have a
standard multinomial logit. Estimation is done using Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
In a future version, we plan to implement Revelt and Train (1998)￿ s mixed logit estimator for
panel data. This estimator adds an extra level of ￿ exibility by assuming a functional form for the
distribution of ￿i and estimating the parameters of this distribution.
6 Results
Before presenting the results, we summarize the sources of time and exchange variation in our data.
Our empirical model includes six sources of variation across exchanges and time. The ￿rst source of
variation is access deregulation. It is location speci￿c and a⁄ects all trading ￿rms with a geographical
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liquidity of DTB over time (DTB￿ s market share remains constant for most of the sample period but
because volumes grew, the liquidity di⁄erential between the two exchanges declined). This source of
variation a⁄ects all traders irrespective of geography, but it potentially a⁄ects di⁄erent business types
di⁄erentially. Likewise, transactions fees and margins are allowed to a⁄ect traders of di⁄erent business
types di⁄erently. The last two sources of time and exchange variation are the time trend and the ￿xed
fees. They a⁄ect all traders equally.
The next tables report our results for the benchmark model. For the estimation, we dropped the
25 groups for which we could not get any information and the 36 groups for which we could establish
they do not trade the Bund. DTB traded the Bund from November 1990 onwards, whereas no more
Bund trades took place on LIFFE after 1 January 1999. For the periods where exchanges do not
trade the Bund, all components of variable costs are set equal to zero. This leaves us with 37,739
group-month observations.
Speci￿cations (1) and (2) in Table 5 constrain the coe¢ cients of the variable costs to be equal for
all business types. Coe¢ cients on liquidity are allowed to vary by business types in speci￿cation (3).
Liquidity at exchange k and time t is de￿ned as log(
volkt+1
100;000) where volkt is the 3-month average of
traded volume at exchange k and period t: Transaction fees are expressed in Pfennig and margins are
expressed in thousands of DM.15
Adoption costs, implicit adoption costs and access deregulation. The top part of Table 5
reports the coe¢ cients for adoption costs. Admissions fees were statistically signi￿cant in all three
speci￿cations and negative as expected. Given that LIFFE never charged an admission fee during the
sample period and that DTB charged 102,000 DM until 1 January 1998 and then zero afterwards,
we will be using this coe¢ cient to give a DM interpretation to the other coe¢ cients. The next set
of estimates, from DTBaccessG through LIFFEaccessUS2, are the regulation and geography related
dummy variables for adoption costs. They capture the implicit costs of adoption, i.e. those costs
incurred by a new member beyond the admission fee charged by the exchanges. All of these estimates
are statistically signi￿cant and negative as expected, indicating that explicit admission costs were only
one part of the costs borne by new members. The coe¢ cients are stable across speci￿cations. If we
use the explicit admission fee coe¢ cient as a benchmark, taking into account that admission fees were
equal to 102,000 DM, we get that implicit adoption costs were of the order of 3 times larger than
explicit admission fees.
15We scaled the variable cost components to bring them in the same range and help with estimation as a result.
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Coe¢ cient (variable) Estimate st. err. Estimate st. err Estimate st. err.
Speci￿cation (1) (2) (3)
ADM (￿1) 2.98 10￿5￿￿ 3.78 10￿6 3.2 10￿5￿￿ 3.96 10￿6 3.02 10￿5￿￿ 3.91 10￿6
DTBaccessG -7.61￿￿ 0.24 -7.40￿￿ 0.27 -7.46￿￿ 0.26
DTBaccessEU1 -10.65￿￿ 0.55 -10.24￿￿ 0.57 -10.98￿￿ 0.66
DTBaccessEU2 -10.87￿￿ 0.52 -10.34￿￿ 0.53 -10.46￿￿ 0.54
DTBaccessEU3 -8.75￿￿ 0.22 -8.22￿￿ 0.24 -8.28￿￿ 0.40
DTBaccessFrench -7.15￿￿ 0.37 -7.10￿￿ 0.40 -6.91￿￿ 0.40
DTBaccessSwiss1 -9.32￿￿ 0.64 -9.43￿￿ 0.93 -9.46￿￿ 0.93
DTBaccessSwiss2 -10.67￿￿ 1.02 -10.96￿￿ 1.22 -11.10￿￿ 1.22
DTBaccessSwiss3 -6.39￿￿ 0.33 -6.52￿￿ 0.73 -6.66￿￿ 0.73
DTBaccessUS1 -9.54￿￿ 1.03 -9.53￿￿ 1.15 -9.62￿￿ 1.17
DTBaccessUS2 -7.42￿￿ 0.42 -7.30￿￿ 0.50 -7.42￿￿ 0.50
DTBaccessUS3 -9.13￿￿ 1.03 -8.96￿￿ 1.05 -9.00￿￿ 1.06
DTBaccessUS4 -6.04￿￿ 0.55 -5.40￿￿ 0.61 -5.64￿￿ 0.63
LIFFEaccessUK -9.40￿￿ 0.16 -9.47￿￿ 0.17 -9.40￿￿ 0.17
LIFFEaccessEU1 -13.24￿￿ 0.60 -13.54￿￿ 0.66 -13.48￿￿ 0.67
LIFFEaccessEU2 -12.26￿￿ 0.59 -12.60￿￿ 0.64 -12.29￿￿ 0.65
LIFFEaccessEU3 -10.57￿￿ 0.59 -10.91￿￿ 0.64 -11.22￿￿ 0.67
LIFFEaccessUS1 -11.70￿￿ 1.01 -10.54￿￿ 1.02 -10.48￿￿ 1.02
FIXED 4.44 10￿5￿￿ 1.25 10￿5 4.84 10￿5 1.3 10￿5 4.67 10￿5￿￿ 1.26 10￿5
FEE (￿1) 4.72 10￿3￿￿ 2.22 10￿3 3.9 10￿3￿ 2.34 10￿3
MARGINS (￿2) 0.27￿￿ 0.06 0.24￿￿ 0.06
LIQUIDITY (￿3) 0.01 0.02 0.03￿ 0.02 See Table 7
LIQUIDITYBOTH (￿4) 1.24￿￿ 0.40 0.74￿ 0.44 See Table 7
time trend yes yes yes
exchange dummies yes no no
exchange-type-HQ dummies no yes yes
Loglikelihood -2,777.63 -2,539.04 -2542.00
Pseudo R2 0.9469 0.9515 0.9514
N 37,739 37,739 37,739
￿￿ indicates signi￿cance at 5%, ￿ indicates signi￿cance at 10%
Within a geography, access costs evolve as expected. Implicit adoption costs at DTB for a EU-based
trader or a Swiss-based trader declined overall as deregulation progressed. Whereas the change in the
law that allowed EU-based ￿rms to become clearing members did not have much a⁄ect, access from
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after the merger with SOFFEX. For the DTBaccessUS series, the rise in magnitude of DTBaccessUS3
relative to the other US coe¢ cients is expected, since this event was a reversal or previous regulations
that allowed more US access to DTB. Implicit adoption costs for LIFFE and for ￿rms with a EU
presence but no presence in the UK was not a⁄ected much by the ISD. This is expected because
the APT was not technically accessible from outside the UK and full migration to electronic (on
Li⁄e.connect) only happenned in May 1999.
Across geographies and for DTB, access costs compare as we expect (and as consistent with the
way we constructed the dummies for groups with several geographical presences) except for the US.
Access costs from Switzerland were lower than from the EU, and except when remote access was
authorized from the US, access from the US was more expensive than from Europe. For the ￿rst part
of the decade, access for ￿rms with a presence in Germany was cheapest. Across geographies and for
LIFFE, our estimates con￿rm that traders with a presence in the UK did incur lower set-up costs than
traders without a UK presence.
Finally, we can compare access costs across exchanges. The coe¢ cient magnitudes indicate that
access to LIFFE was more di¢ cult than access to DTB.
Table 6: Evidence of HQ location - business type e⁄ects
DTB LIFFE BOTH
UK HQ Universal n/a 4.01￿￿ 7.31￿￿
(0.92) (1.63)
IB 4.14￿￿ 5.02￿￿ 7.24￿￿
(0.88) (0.64) (1.38)
Brokerage 1.44￿ 3.98￿￿ 6.49￿￿
(0.78) (0.47) (1.31)
German HQ Universal 3.43￿￿ n/a 7.86￿￿
(0.70) (1.45)
IB 4.30￿￿ 5.95￿￿ 7.61￿￿
(0.76) (0.95) (1.40)
Brokerage 2.79￿￿ n/a n/a
(0.70)
US HQ Universal 2.34￿￿ 3.76￿￿ 6.36￿￿
(1.05) (0.72) (1.53)
IB 3.43￿￿ 4.04￿￿ 7.86￿￿
(0.70) (0.54) (1.32)
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exchange-business-types-HQ-location dummies (the headquarter locations were US, UK, Germany,
Switzerland, EU except for Germany and UK, ROW). The omitted categories are for the "none"
choice, thus the interpretation for each of these variables should be relative to the preference of a
given trader for an exchange relative to not being a member of any exchange. Many of these dummies
were signi￿cant indicating that trader-exchange unobservables might be important. Table 6 reports
a subset of these coe¢ cients for speci￿cation (2). (n/a indicates that the dummy is essentially not
identi￿ed).
Across locations and business types, the value for the ￿xed e⁄ect for "BOTH" is larger than the
￿xed e⁄ects for the individual exchanges. This suggests that the two exchanges were far from being
substitutes from the point of view of traders even if they were subsitutes if we only consider the Bund.
Unlike universal banks and investment banks, brokerages can be more or less focused. It is interesting
in this respect to compare the value of the ￿xed e⁄ects for the UK and US-headquartered brokerages.
They suggest a higher pattern of specialization among US-headquartered brokerages.
Table 6 also allows us to assess the theory according to which German traders were biased to-
wards DTB. We use the US-headquartered ￿rms as a benchmark for unbiasedness and compare the
￿xed e⁄ects for investment banks (the only category for which all ￿xed e⁄ects are available). UK-
headquartered investment banks valued LIFFE 0.85 points higher than DTB. This is to be compared
with 0.60 for US-headquartered investment banks and 1.65 for German-headquartered banks. This
is hardly evidence of nationalistic bias. If anything, German investment banks were biased towards
LIFFE.
Variable costs coe¢ cients. The second half of Table 5 reports the coe¢ cients on the variable costs.
Transaction fees and margins are both signi￿cant but with the wrong sign. This may be due to these
variables capturing something else. If we abstract from the short-lived price wars which are unlikely to
have an e⁄ect on membership decisions, DTB￿ s transaction fees remained constant across the period
whereas LIFFE￿ s transaction fees came down as LIFFE was losing the Bund. Thus the coe¢ cient may
be capturing a liquidity e⁄ect rather than a fee e⁄ect. Likewise, margins are driven by the underlying
risk of the contract and is thus connected to volatility in the market. Because trading also tends to
increase with volatility, margins may also capture some aspects of liquidity.
Liquidity has a positive impact on pro￿ts as expected. The coe¢ cients are signi￿cant in speci￿ca-
tion (2). Only ￿4 is sign￿cant in speci￿cation (1). In speci￿cation (3), we drop the fees and margins
and estimate business-type speci￿c coe¢ cients for liquidity. The results are reported in Table 7. Most
coe¢ cients are positive as expected. Both are signi￿cant for investment banks and brokerages but
with di⁄erent magnitudes. The coe¢ cient for universal banks is signi￿cant for the liquidity of both
exchanges, the coe¢ cient for proprietary is signi￿cant for individual exchanges. The results suggest
that there is more heterogeneity for the value to liquidity of both exchanges.
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￿3 ￿4
Est. Std.Dev. Est. Std.Dev.
universal bank 0.06 0.04 1.23￿￿ 0.55
retail bank 0.09 0.09 4.61 3.21
IB 0.05￿ 0.03 0.97￿￿ 0.45
specialized 0.04 0.04 0.38 0.54
brokerage 0.12￿￿ 0.03 2.50￿￿ 0.80
assetmgt 0.10 0.09 -1.22 1306.90
proprietary 0.09￿￿ 0.03 -0.26 0.64
Standard deviation in parenthesis ￿￿indicates signi￿cance at 5%
7 Conclusions
Liquidity matters in ￿nancial markets. This creates a tendency for trading to concentrate on a single
exchange and gives incumbent exchanges a ￿rst-mover advantage. However, exchanges di⁄er in other
dimensions than liquidity. National regulation, product portfolio, user convenience all provide scope for
di⁄erentiation. Competition and coexistence will be possible when these other dimensions of exchange
di⁄erentiation can counterbalance the incumbent￿ s liquidity advantage.
This paper is a ￿rst attempt at evaluating the contribution of these dimensions of di⁄erentiation to
the attractiveness of exchanges. Understanding the sources of exchange di⁄erentiation has implications
for exchange strategies, for competition policy, and, more generally, for the normative evaluation of
market structure in the exchange industry.
The current version of this paper describes the dataset we have collected, lays out a very simple
model for traders￿choice, and reports the estimates from this model. The advantage of our dataset
is that we matched the members from both exchanges and tracked their group a¢ liation, histories,
and geographical presence. As a result, two features of the competition between LIFFE and DTB
stand out by simply looking at descriptive statistics. First, the Battle of the Bund is a story of
newcomers rather than switchers. These newcomers result from an increase in the size of the market
for exchange membership and an increase in the proportion of these ￿rms that are e⁄ectively members
of an exchange. Second, geographical presence is a key determinant of adoption time for DTB and it
is clearly connected to the timing of access deregulation.
The econometric results con￿rm this and provide further insights into the way the Battle of the
Bund played out. Geographically-determined access costs are highly signi￿cant and explain most of
the variation in the data. Access costs decreased over time as access deregulation spread and explain
the increase in the number of DTB members.
We also found evidence of heterogeneity in the match between traders and exchanges suggesting
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did not ￿nd evidence that German-headquartered groups were more likely to join DTB over LIFFE,
once we controlled for geographical presence. Thus, if it is likely that nationality played a role in
explaining the early membership by some German institutions, it does not explain why DTB continued
to attract some many new members, including German ones. Another interesting result from the
econometric analysis is that LIFFE and DTB memberships were far from being substitutes in traders￿
payo⁄ function: a dual membership creates as much value as the sum of the values from individual
memberships. This reinforces the idea that exchanges - and LIFFE and DTB in particular - are
di⁄erentiated competitors.
Finally, we found some evidence that liquidity mattered for some type of groups when deciding
which exchange to join. However, the current results seem sensitive to the speci￿cation. They warrant
further analysis.
To summarize, the story the data tells is one of horizontal di⁄erentiation induced arti￿cially by
national access barriers that came down following the European Investment Services Directive and
access deregulation in the US, with secondary roles played by liquidity and product portfolio e⁄ects.
DTB won the Battle of the Bund because it won a membership war.
We intend to push our results in two directions. First, we intend to estimate alternative speci-
￿cations to control for trader heterogeneity and cross-product e⁄ects, alternative timing for traders￿
decision making and speci￿cation testing. Second, while the fact that we do not impose that DTB
and LIFFE behaved optimally limits what we can do in terms of counter-factuals, we can already
investigate the following questions:
1. How much was access deregulation worth for DTB? (by considering the alternative admission
fee DTB should have charged to maintain adoption constant, absent deregulation)
2. Is there evidence that the exchanges optimized their fee structure? (by considering the costs of
alternative fee structure that would have generated the same adoption behavior).
3. Holding the behavior of DTB ￿xed, what would it have taken LIFFE to keep the Bund?
We end with some comments on the relationship between the Battle of the Bund and ￿nancial
integration in Europe. The Battle of the Bund is often seen as a proof of the superiority of electronic
trading over open outcry. In fact, the Battle of the Bund is as much a tribute to access deregulation in
the EU (and in the US) than it is a tribute to electronic trading. The advantage that electronic trading
conferred to DTB could not have achieved their full potential if access had not been deregulated. Access
deregulation facilitated the access to the Bund future from other countries than Germany and the UK
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June 20078 Appendix A: Description of data and variable construction
This appendix complements the main text. It describes how the ￿rm dataset was constructed and
provides de￿nitions for the geography and time contingent adoption costs and for the exchange period
dummies.
8.1 Firm dataset
The main text reports that, for each individual establishment, we collected information on (1) its
(historical) group a¢ liation including mergers and acquisitions, (2) the establishment inception date
and, if applicable, its closing date, (3) the group inception date and, if applicable, its bankruptcy
date, (4) the activities of the establishment, and (5) whether the establishment trades the Bund or
any other long-term government bond derivatives. This information was collected manually using the
following procedure:
1. Group and establishment inception dates and exit dates. Inception dates for existing compa-
nies were taken from ORBIS, UKdata.com or by contacting the establishment directly.16 For
bankrupt establishments located in Germany and Switzerland, we used the Dufa-Index and the
Dun&Bradstreet (Swtizerland)￿ s records (both available through Factiva).17 Factiva was used
to track any available information for other bankrupt ￿rms (e.g. reports of bankruptcy ￿ling,
trading license being upheld). Some establishments still exist legally but are no longer active.
Those appear in ORBIS with the mention "inactive" and we took the date of the last ￿nancial
accounts as the exit date.
2. Information on group ownership structure including mergers and acquisitions was gathered from
company websites, ORBIS, UKdata.com, Dufa-Index, Dun & Bradstreet and press articles (Fac-
tiva). We consider that an establishment belongs to a group when it is owned 100% by this
group or when it is clearly managed as a wholly-owned subsidiary (for example, a common own-
ership structure for specialized trading ￿rms is that the local partners own a small fraction - of
the order of 5% - of the capital of the local subsidiary. In these case, we considered that the
establishment belonged to the group).
16ORBIS is a database of about 15 million listed and non listed companies worlwide that aggregates legal
(such as legal status, inception date, structure of ownership), ￿nancial (balance sheets) and business information
(www.bvdep.com/ORBIS.html). UKdata.com has the same kind of information but is limited to UK companies
(www.ukdata.com).
17The Dufa Index is published by Dumrath & Fassnacht. It contains registration information of German companies, as
published in the o¢ cial daily Bundesanzeiger. It includes information on legal status, change of ownership, management,
liquidation, settlement and mergers & acquistions. The information is available from 8 June 1994. Dun & Bradstreet
(Switzerland)￿ s records contain all company-related publications by the Swiss o¢ cial gazette of commerce (SHAB). The
information is available from 20 August 1996.
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on company websites, ORBIS, and press articles during the relevant period, as well as direct
phone or email contract with the company when possible. We recorded the following business
activities: retail banking, investment banking, private banking,18 asset management, proprietary
trading, market making, brokerage for institutional or professional traders, brokerage for retail
clients, arcade19 and universal banking.
4. Information on the products traded was taken from company websites, LIFFE￿ s product licenses,
LIFFE￿ s and DTB￿ s notices to members, press articles during the relevant period, and phone
calls to the establishment when possible.
8.2 Regulation-driven adoption costs
8.2.1 DTB
Initially, a trader had to have an o¢ ce in Germany to be a member of DTB and only German ￿rms
could be clearing members. On 28 July 1993, there was a change in the law and EU trading ￿rms
with a German o¢ ce could become clearing members. In September 1994, MATIF members could
become members of DTB and the Dutch authorities recognized DTB and authorized Dutch-based
￿rms to trade on DTB for their own account. The EU Investment Services Directive came into force
in January 1996. Switzerland is not part of the EU and thus access from Switzerland followed its
own timetable. Acess points were installed in Zurich in January 1996 and SOFFEX members became
members of Eurex when SOFFEX and DTB merged in September 1998. Finally, the US Commodities
Futures Trading Commission granted a no-action letter to DTB on 28 February 1996 which authorized
US-based traders to trade on DTB. The authorization was frozen in October 1998, forbidding any new
membership from the US. It was reinstated in August 1999.
A single geography-time adoption dummy is turned out for each group that is not a member.
For groups with geographical presence in several locations, we considered the "closest" geographical
location according to the following a-priori order: Germany ￿ France and the Netherlands between
9/94 and 12/95 ￿ Switzerland ￿ EU except France and the Netherlands between 9/94 and 12/95
￿ US. We con￿rm ex-post that this order is the correct one on the basis of our estimation results.
Locations included in the construction are those prevailing at t ￿ 3: The following table summarizes
the value for the D(i￿ s most favorable location given k and t) variable.
18Private banks, essentially a German-Swiss concept, o⁄er ￿nancial advice and asset management to wealthy individ-
uals. They also o⁄er some corporate banking services.
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June 2007Name Events Location t between ...
DTBaccessG Germany 11/90-12/99
DTBaccessSwiss1 Switzerland 11/90-12/95
DTBaccessSwiss2 Access points in Zurich Switzerland 1/96-8/98
DTBaccessSwiss3 Merger with SOFFEX Switzerland 9/98-12/99
DTBaccessEU1 EU 11/90-7/93
DTBaccessEU2 EU-based institutions can be clearing members EU 8/93-12/95
DTBaccessEU3 Investment Service Directive EU 1/96-12/99
DTBaccessFrench Dutch regulatory approval + link with MATIF France and NL 9/94-12/95
DTBaccessUS1 US 11/90-2/96
DTBaccessUS2 CFTC no-action letter US 3/96-9/98
DTBaccessUS3 CFTC no-action letter upheld US 10/98-7/99
DTBaccessUS4 CFTC no-action letter reinstated US 8/99-12/99
8.2.2 LIFFE
Until August 1998, LIFFE was an open-outcry exchange, requiring LIFFE members to have sta⁄
based in London. We distinguished between groups that had a presence in the UK and those that
did not have a presence in the UK before they joined the exchange. For those without a UK presence
but a European presence, we distinguished three periods: before the European Investment Service
Directive, after the ISD but before LIFFE moved the Bund to electronic trading in August 1998, and
after August 1998. For ￿rms with a US presence only, we distinguished between two periods, before
July 1999 when the CFTC issued a no action letter for Li⁄e.connect, and after. The resulting variables
are: LIFFEaccessUK, LIFFEaccessEU1, LIFFEaccessEU2, LIFFEaccessEU3, LIFFEaccessUS1 and
LIFFEaccessUS2.
8.3 Other events a⁄ecting the attractiveness of DTB and LIFFE
The next two tables record the events that a⁄ect the attractiveness of DTB and LIFFE, beyond those
already controlled for in the base speci￿cation. Unless speci￿ed, dummies turn on from the date
onwards and can thus be interpreted as the marginal impact of the event on the attractiveness of each
exchange. An exception for this rule is DTB￿ s change in the Bund contract speci￿cation because it
was matched by LIFFE in November 1992. Thus, that particular dummy is equal to one only between
6/92 and 11/92. Another exception is LIFFE￿ s link with CBOT which is only alive between May and
December 1997. Launches of complementary products or of trading facilities fostering trades with a
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4/95 Cut in one-time connection charges adoption cost +
4/98 DTB o⁄ers free computers to LIFFE members adoption cost +
9/98 Merger with SOFFEX to create Eurex +
Date Events a⁄ecting the attractiveness of LIFFE Type Sign
12/93 Launch of new Automated Trading Platform (APT) market rules +
5/97 LIFFE-CBOT link started (stopped by 12/97) extra trading opportunities +
6/97 Top step initiative market rules ?
3/98 Director David Kyte resigns in protest against strategy corporate governance -
7/98 LIFFE subsidizes APT stations marketing +
8/98 Bund trading moved entirely to APT stations market rules +
5/99 Bund only traded on Li⁄e.connect,demutualization voted market rules, corp. gov. +
9 Appendix B: Economics of futures trading
This section provides a concise overview of the basics of futures trading for the purpose of determining
the relevant factors we will need to take into account in our analysis.
A future (contract) is a promise to sell or to buy a speci￿c instrument at a future date and at
a given price. At the time of the agreement, the price and maturity are decided, but typically no
payment is made. Delivery and payment take place at maturity.
Because economic conditions may have changed between the time of the agreement and the matu-
rity date, the ex-ante bene￿cial contract is usually no longer bene￿cial ex-post for one of the parties.
This creates an incentive to default. Futures have been used at all times and places, and various
mechanisms have been used to mitigate this default risk. One of them is the use of exchanges and
clearing.
9.1 Exchange-traded futures
Two key features characterize exchange-mediated futures trading. First, future contracts traded on
exchanges are standardized. The exchange de￿nes the product (size of the contract, delivery date,
product that can be delivered) and its trading rules (hours, minimum tick size, ...). Standardization
pools liquidity around a limited set of contracts and makes it easier for traders to ￿nd a counterpart
at the best price. Second, exchange-traded contracts are cleared by a clearing house. Clearing is
the process by which a trade￿ initially an agreement between two traders￿ is transformed into a
commitment by each trader vis-￿-vis the clearing house. In return for acting as a central counterparty,
the clearing house requires each trader to put up margins as collateral. Margins are updated daily
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gories of market organization: ￿ oor-based trading (also known as open outcry) and electronic trading.
In ￿ oor-based trading, traders meet in a single physical venue and shout the price at which they are
willing to buy or sell. All orders are channeled through traders on the ￿ oor. In electronic trading,
traders can, in principle, be located anywhere in the world. They sit behind a computer connected to
the exchange and input orders into the market through their computers. Orders are matched on the
basis of price and some time priority rule. For most of the 1990s, LIFFE was an open outcry exchange
and DTB was an electronic exchange.
Participation in futures exchanges is restricted to members. Futures exchanges impose conditions
on new members to ensure the well functioning of their markets. New members must prove their ￿nan-
cial stability and clearing arrangements must be in place (i.e. the new member must be "approved"
by the exchange￿ s clearing house, or must have an agreement with a member of the clearing house).
New members must take an exam con￿rming their knowledge of basic ￿nance and of the exchange￿ s
market rules and code of conduct.
Corporate governance. Traditionally, exchanges were set up as member-owned and member-
managed organizations. Members owned a seat and/or shares in the exchange. Recently, there has
been a worldwide move towards demutualization and thus decoupling between ownership and mem-
bership. In particular, LIFFE demutualized in May 1999. Members of DTB were not shareholders.
9.2 Market participants and trading motives
Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between three trading motives: hedging, speculation and arbi-
trage. Futures trading was initially set up to hedge risk. A ￿rm or individual with a commitment to
deliver or buy a product or money in the future would be able to lock in the cost of this transaction
today by buying or selling a future contract. Speculators trade on the basis of their forecasts about the
future movement of prices: they take positions, hoping that prices will move in a direction favorable
to them. Finally, arbitrageurs are traders who speculate on the basis of price co-movements between
similar securities. For example, an arbitrageur might simultaneously buy a future on a 2-year bond
and sell a future on a 5-year bond, hoping to derive a pro￿t from the variation in relative interest
rates.
Today and in most futures markets, pure hedgers are in the minority. Speculators and arbitrageurs
dominate. The reason has to do with the way future contracts are traded. At the time of the trade,
no money is transferred. Only margins, often representing less than 2-3% of the value of the contract,
must be deposited with the clearing house to guarantee the trade. Thus, very large positions can be
taken, without having to commit signi￿cant ￿nancial resources. This leverage is unique to derivatives
markets and explains their success with asset managers, investment banks and hedge funds.
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The costs of trading on an exchange fall into three categories: adoption costs, ￿xed costs, and variable
costs incurred when trading.
Adoption costs. Traders must be members of an exchange to be able to trade on it without using
a broker. New members bear the cost of training their traders to use the exchange and the cost of
satisfying all the ￿nancial requirements for being a member. In addition, some exchanges charge an
admission fee or require that the new member buys a seat or shares in the exchange. Finally, a new
member would need to organize his back o¢ ce to keep track of trade orders, current open positions,
commissions and margins. Together, these adoption costs are far from trivial. A March 1996 article
estimated those set-up costs for a US-based trading ￿rm wanting to join DTB at one million dollars.20
Fixed costs. Fixed costs include the annual fees members pay to the exchanges, as well as a series of
fees in return for some service, independently of the amount traded. Those service fees are typically
priced at cost and are not a source of pro￿t for exchanges.
Variable costs. Variable costs of trading are made of three components: transaction fees, margins,
and price impact costs. First, on each contract traded, a trader pays a transaction fee to the exchange
and a clearing fee to the clearing house. Second, for each new open position a trader has, margins
must be deposited at the clearing house.21 Some clearing houses pay interests on margins but many
do not. In particular, LIFFE￿ s clearing house did remunerate margins but DTB￿ s clearing house did
not. However, even when margins accrue interests, this return may be much lower than what a trader
could generate elsewhere. Thus, margins generate an opportunity cost. Third, a trader may in￿ uence
the price of the future when trying to buy or sell large quantities. The impact cost of a transaction
is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the theoretical "equilibrium price" for the contract at the time of
the transaction and the realized price for the transaction. Impact costs are related to the liquidity of
a market. The more liquid a market is, the less speci￿c orders a⁄ect prices. Figure 8 represents the
impact cost of a ten-unit transaction in a liquid and less liquid market. The state of the market at
a particular time is captured by the unmet demand and supply (this would correspond to the order
book in an electronic order-driven market). These are closer to one another in a liquid market. The
equilibrium price is de￿ned as the average of the lowest unmet ask price and the highest unmet bid
20"DTB receives CFTC approval to install trading screens in U.S.", Securities Week, vol. 23, No. 10, 11 March 1996.
21A new position is opened when a trade does not cancel an earlier open position. For example, suppose that a trader
buys a future contract at time t, and sells the same future contract at time t+1. From the clearing house￿ s perspective,
these two transactions cancel out and there is no residual default risk after t + 1: In this case, margins will be required
only for one day.
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peqm
Impact cost
Unmet supply (ask prices)
Unmet demand (bid prices)
peqm
Impact cost
Unmet supply (ask prices)
Unmet demand (bid prices)
Figure 8: Impact costs in a less liquid (left panel) and liquid market (right panel)
The variable costs that a trader incurs depend on his trading behavior. First, some exchanges have
di⁄erent transaction fees for di⁄erent classes of traders. For much of the 1990s, LIFFE had a reduced
"scratch trade" transaction fee for traders trading on their own account, when they liquidated positions
at the same price as the price at which they opened them, within the same day. The scratch trade fee
was meant to encourage those traders to provide liquidity by reducing the penalty they bore in case
they made no trading pro￿t. Second, the opportunity cost of margins depends on the average length
during which a trader keeps his position open. Day-traders for example are speculators who speculate
on within day price movements. They close their positions every night, thereby foregoing margins
completely. At the other extreme, hedgers will typically keep their positions open until maturity, and
thus bear the opportunity cost of margins until then. Finally, impact costs depend on the size of trades
a trader executes. The larger the transactions, the higher the impact costs, everything else equal.
Transaction fees, opportunity cost of margins and price impact costs were of comparable size for
the Bund contract in the 1990￿ s. Moreover, two di⁄erent traders could rank the two exchanges di⁄er-
ently on the basis of these variable costs as the following back-of-the-envelope calculation illustrates.
Consider an average trader trading 10,000 contracts a month in April 1995. At that time, transaction
fees were 0.45 £ on LIFFE (that is, the equivalent of 1 DM) and 0.50 DM on DTB. Initial margins
were 3,500 DM on LIFFE and 5,000 DM on DTB. We consider two scenarios for the opportunity cost
of margins. In the ￿rst scenario, the trader is a day trader who closes all his positions at the end of
the day. He does not need to deposit any margins. At the other extreme, the trader keeps on average
a position open for 15 days. We assume a 3% opportunity cost of capital. Under this assumption, the
opportunity cost of margin deposits for this trader were equal to (1:03
1
24 ￿ 1) ￿ 3500 = 4:3 DM per
contract on LIFFE and 6:2 DM on DTB. Finally, consider the impact cost. Suppose that Eurex was
less liquid in April 1995, meaning that 3% of the contracts were traded at one tick higher (or lower)
than the best bid or ask, and that this number was only 2% on LIFFE. Given a tick size of 25 DM,
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total average variable costs of trading were lower on DTB (1.25 DM per contract versus 1.5 DM).
From the "long term" trader on the other hand, the cost comparison favored LIFFE (5.8DM versus
7.45 DM).
This example illustrates that the di⁄erent components of variable costs are roughly in the same
ball park: none dominates the others. It also illustrates that di⁄erent traders may rank the exchanges
di⁄erently on the basis of their trading costs. A similar example can be generated where the preference
for one or the other exchange depends of traders￿average transaction sizes and thus impact costs.
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